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Discussion
Chairman: Myres McDougal
Animateur: Armand de Mestral
Rapporteur: Naomi Duguid
Chairman Myres McDougal
I am going to suggest a slightly different organization from that which is
indicated in Professor de Mestral's paper. The outline I would suggest follows
on the remarks I made this morning. Dispute settlement is too narrow a
focus. As an anthropologist would see the situation, our two countries have a
lot of common problems. These problems are common not only to this continent, but to the whole hemisphere, and in some measure to the entire globe.
There is a higher degree of interdependence on our continent, but because of
the extent of global interdependence, none of our problems are genuinely
domestic, internal problems. They are all transnational in impact.
The problem that demonstrates this best is that of the environment. Let
us, first, identify what the factual problems are. Second, we should consider
what the relevant policies might be and the degree to which we share acceptance of these policies. Third, we can examine the existing structure of the
legal myth and the difficulties which this imposes upon us. Finally, we can
consider the future and possible new alternatives in decisions. In this way, we
may be able to move slowly from a very high level of abstraction to the most
concrete particular instances. Now, let us look at each of these points briefly.
First, what, in terms of fact, are the more important environmental problems? This word "pollution" is just a vague word for "destructively affecting
the environment." What are the specific environmental problems relating to
oceans, lakes, rivers and land masses?
Second, what fundamental policies does Professor de Mestral recommend
in relation to these problems? We should consider the degree to which we are
willing to accept and share these policies, for application across our boundaries.
From this very explicit policy level, we will move to the legalistic level.
What are the inherited doctrines and decision procedures? What are the types
of injuries which occur? Apparently, the activities that affect the quality of
the environment include a whole range of modalities, from the most
deliberate intent to affect the environment to the completely inadvertant and
unintended accident. That is one range of facts in terms of the actor's subjective state of mind. Another range of facts is a little more contextual in
reference. Some activities are ultra hazardous, involving a very great risk of
severe damage to the environment. Other activities are attended by very little
risk. These are the ordinary activities that are involved in exchanges across
our boundaries. The legalistic ways of talking about this leave me gasping.
There are references to strict liability, absolute liability, Rylands v. Fletcher,
and application of preexisting rules and equitable application apart from ex-
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isting rules. None of this has much meaning for an observer who is not a professional.
Finally, what are the various settlement procedures available to us? The
first problem, in this regard, is whether there are any constitutional difficulties in cooperating here. The United States still seeks to evade some
responsibilities on the ground that it is a "federal state." A question about the
competence of Canada, as a whole, was raised this morning. There is some
suggestion that your country is a "federal state," not completely "sovereign."
There are also distinctions between "legal" and "political" matters which are
still made in my country, at least for the purpose of serving special interests.
What is the scope of Canada's treaty power? Perhaps we can clarify these
constitutional problems.
Assuming we are able to conquer constitutional difficulties, what are the
procedures available to us? Consider Article 33 of the United Nations
Charter. Is there any way of ordering the different modalities recited there
and of establishing priorities? What are the best ways of handling these problems? I confess that I begin with a preference for simple negotiation: sitting
down and talking the problems over. But we may need more permanent institutions for clarifying and securing common interests. We may wish to
distinguish environmental problems from those being considered by the other
two committees and suggest unique institutional modalities for cooperating,
with respect to the maintenance and improvement of the quality of the environment. It may be appropriate to evaluate the possibilities of a special
commission with competence, across the board, on environmental problems.
We ought to consider the idea presented by Professor Macdonald: is it
desirable to have some kind of threat in the background, whereby a thirdparty decision-maker requires us to negotiate seriously if the initial bilateral
negotiations do not yield results? Is it desirable to involve other parties in the
matter, such as Japan or Mexico, or whoever may be affected by the activities?
We must think of our problem, not merely in terms of dispute settlement, but rather in terms of long-term prevention, short-term deterrence and
restoration in situations in which damage has occurred. Our objective should
be to achieve a very comprehensive view of the substantive environmental
problem and the potential institutional arrangements for cooperative resolution.
William Epstein
I would like to talk about an aspect of pollution and Canadian-American
relations. It is a pollution of a much more dangerous and much more important order than ordinary marine pollution and oil spills. This involves the
Trident submarines in the Bangor base two miles from Seattle, Washington.
It is in the process of being built and will be the largest nuclear weapons base
in the entire world. Therefore, it will be a target of the highest priority in the
event of a nuclear attack. There are, obviously, two aspects of this problem.
The first one is the security and survival of the western world. Second, there
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is the problem of pollution in the Juan de Fuca Strait, one of the most heavily travelled straits in the world. At some points, it is only eleven miles wide
and the boundary line goes right down the center. Consequently, at some
points there are only five or six miles on either side. The Trident submarine
will weigh over eighteen thousand tons and will measure more than five hundred feet in length. The Polaris/Poseidon submarine is only eight thousand
tons and four hundred feet long. The Polaris/Poseidon submarine has sixteen
missiles; the Trident will have twenty-four missiles.
The Trident is completely unnecessary, and serves only to fuel the arms
race. Furthermore, it poses a threat not merely to the people in the Seattle,
Portland and Tacoma area, but also to the people in Vancouver, Victoria,
southern British Columbia and southern Alberta. In fact, it is a threat to all
of the people in the Northern hemisphere because of radioactive fallout.
Canada was not consulted about the establishment of the Bangor base.
When I raised this matter with the authorities in Washington and Ottawa, I
was told by then-Secretary of State of External Affairs McEachern that not
only was Canada not consulted, it had no right to be consulted. This was
something that was strictly an American decision. They also mentioned an
1846 agreement providing for the free passage of ships in the Strait of Juan
de Fuca. This was an agreement which, at that time, involved merely commercial shipping. Now, it applies to such things as nuclear submarines. As a
result of tradition and usage, warships can ply the strait. As I understand it,
nothing in the joint defense treaty between the United States and Canada
specifically authorizes this.
There is a principle of international law, not merely in Rylands v. Fletcher, but in old Roman law, which says: sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
Loosely interpreted, this means: "You must not do with your property anything which can do damage to your neighbor." This is the same idea as:
"You must not bring a tiger on your land." I think the Americans are bringing two tigers on their land. First, there is the danger of pollution as a result
of collisions and accidents in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Second, if there is
ever a war between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Bangor base
will be the primary target. I have heard the argument used in Ottawa that if
there is ever a nuclear war, we are all dead. Well, that does not fit in with
the new American philosophy of flexible response. Aside from that, if the
Russians were to attack the Bangor base, there is a strong possibility of missing their target. Victoria is less than sixty miles away, and Vancouver is less
than one hundred miles away. When a missile is going six thousand or eight
thousand miles, it can go a little bit off course and land on Victoria or Vancouver. If it were to land nearby in the water, we might even have a tidal
wave that would drown most of the population.
This is an issue of the utmost importance, and it is related to many other
important issues in addition to pollution and environmental law. In the State
of Washington, a law suit has been commenced attacking the Bangor base on
the grounds that, among other things, a proper environmental impact statement was not prepared. Although the trial judge refused to grant an injunc-

1978]

DISCUSSION

tion against the construction of the base, he found for the plaintiffs, and the
judgment is being appealed. Construction began just a few months ago, and
the first Trident nuclear submarine will be launched sometime in 1980. The
Canadian government should seemingly pay more attention to the wishes of
the people in British Columbia. The American government should be encouraged to build the base in a less populated area. If enough pressure is
brought to bear, they will probably stop building the base. It is totally unnecessary from a strategic point of view, and such a step can do much to
improve the environment and safety of the people in North America and in
the northern part of the world. It can also act as a real break on the
escalating nuclear arms race, because if the Americans will do this, the Russians will act similarly with respect to the Kamchatka-Vladivostok area.
Chairman McDougal
We thank Mr. Epstein for his intervention. He clearly points out the
interdependence of all these activities. He also makes very clear the policy
conflicts. When others of you intervene, I hope you will try to keep our
outline in mind. What are the facts with which we are concerned? What are
the policies? What is the law? What are the potential remedies? For Mr.
Epstein's benefit, this law he talks about already exists in the form of the
international customary law. However, courts are not going to apply it,
because they will not have the courage. They will call it a political question
and head for the door.
Erik Wang
I would like to make a few comments based on my experiences over the
last couple of years. I have been involved in negotiations with the United
States concerning transfrontier pollution problems. The areas discussed included west coast tankers, the Beaufort Sea and offshore drilling.
I would like to compliment Professor de Mestral on his overview of the
subject which coincides very much with my own ideas. I am in complete
agreement with his judgment that international law with respect to transfrontier pollution is at an embryonic stage. I would also agree that governments have been slow in coping with the problems of transfrontier pollution.
The balance of remedies is not yet there. It is being put into place slowly and
will take many years. I think Professor de Mestral put it very well when he
suggested there is a need to raise the general level of consciousness among
politicians, legislators and lawyers. When we adjust our domestic laws, we
must look over our shoulder to see what impact or lack of impact our actions
could have on people living across the border.
I believe the overall problem can be characterized by saying technology
has run very far ahead of lawyers and legislators. One example of this is seen
in Canada's Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, a fairly recent and, indeed, a fairly innovative piece of domestic legislation. It is so innovative that
a number of other countries, including the United States, found it objectionable when it was first introduced, although it is now meeting with a high
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degree of acceptance. The Act was drafted from a Canadian point of view
with the interests of Canadians in mind. This is not unnatural, and I do not
think anybody would want to apologize for that.
In the last two years, however, we commenced offshore drilling in the
Beaufort Sea, and Denmark began exploratory drilling on its side of the
Davis Strait. We become very conscious of the lacuna in the Arctic Waters
Act which, as presently drafted, gives foreigners no clear access to the highly
favorable liability regime of absolute liability which is available to Canadians.
If a United States resident, living just over the line on the Beaufort Sea were
to be damaged by a major oilspill or blowout from a site under Canadian
jurisdiction, he would have virtually no rights of access or standing under the
Act. Consequently, we have had to improvise. Season by season, we negotiate
a kind of jerry-built liability and compensation fund with Dome Petroleum
and their associates. This gives the Americans some assurance they will not be
without a remedy if the worst happens.
Negotiators in these various areas would like a claimant to have access on
the basis of local remedies without discrimination. We look, first, to domestic
law. If there is concern, for example, about the possibility of a blowout from
a Danish drilling operation in the Davis Strait, we look to Danish law. We
ask ourselves what standing a Canadian has if there is a major spill which
damages the coast of Baffin Island and destroys wildlife? Would the hypothetical Canadian claimant have to argue on the basis of fault or strict liability,
or could he benefit from a regime of absolute liability such as he would enjoy
under the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act if the damage originated in
Canadian territory? Finally, if he is successful in the foreign court, what are
his prospects for collecting the judgment? Can the company or shipowner
declare immediate bankruptcy and escape full payment?
The emphasis on local remedies is not just a solicitude for the old rule of
exhausting local remedies before presenting an international claim. It goes
much deeper than that. Several aspects of the problem demonstrate that it is
more advantageous to develop parallel legal regimes under domestic law,
rather than attempt to develop a superstructure of undertakings and obligations between respective governments. One area where this advantage is
apparent is in the context of determining the applicable law. International
lawyers are going to be arguing, for a long time, whether certain kinds of
pollution should be subject to certain degrees of liability.
There are very different approaches, for example, to oil pollution. Many
states regard this as a threat to the environment which calls for the most stringent standard of absolute liability, similar to that which exists under the
Arctic Waters Act. Other states would argue that while strict liability is not
good enough, the shipowner or the offshore drilling operator should be able
to assert some defenses, such as "act of God." Other countries argue that simple negligence should be the appropriate basis for action. This argument may
not be resolved for a long time. Meanwhile, technology is getting ahead of us.
Major transfrontier spills will occur, and claimants will be anxious to learn
what their rights and remedies are.
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The only way to deal with so many different approaches to liability is to
look to domestic law. We must seek to influence the direction of our
neighbors' legislation, just as they must seek to influence the direction of our
legislation. This is certainly a time-consuming process, but it is one 'which is
being faced more clearly by officials and parliamentarians on both sides of
the border.
The difficulties encountered by creating a superstructure of international
law are also seen in the efforts made to create funds which would be available
in the event of major damage. This is becoming a very real problem now that
we have had experiences of transfrontier pollution running into millions of
dollars. In the Arrow incident on the east coast, the cleanup and damage bill
was approximately four million dollars. I believe the most expensive oil pollution case in history involved the oil refinery in Japan. It was not, strictly
speaking, a marine pollution incident. It did not happen at sea. However, the
massive oilspill from the land facilities at the refinery resulted in expenditures
of 100 million dollars in order to clean it up. There are few entrepreneurs or
insurance companies who are able to meet such astronomical costs, although
the outer limit with respect to the latter has yet to be definitively set.
The fund set up under the Arctic Waters Act is currently at a level of fifty
million dollars. If there were seventy million dollars worth of claims against
that fund, which claims would have the highest priority? Any attempts to
work that out between countries invites enormous problems. In the Beaufort
Sea case, for example, we had created a fund of about twenty million dollars
in favor of potential American claimants, and forty million dollars in favor of
Canadian claimants. The Americans, quite understandably, questioned the
equity of such a split. Depending upon the way the currents run and the
location and nature of the spill, the major damage could be done on the
Alaskan coast rather than on the Canadian coast.
Finally, we are confronted with the whole question of delays. The hypothetical claimant will be seeking remedies on an expeditious basis. When the
claimant is reminded that it took almost twenty years to settle the Trail
Smelter claims, he will understandably express strong dissatisfaction. The
inescapable conclusion seems to be that when governments get into the process of trying to settle cross-border claims on a government-to-government
basis, regardless of what or how good the intentions may be, a process of
delay sets in as they work out all the modalities. A great deal of time is consumed setting up an arbitral tribunal to process the claims or deciding upon
the terms of reference for an existing tribunal. It is a very cumbersome
business when governments get into the act with their big galoshes. The emphasis in our talks with the Americans must be placed upon the issue of
hastening the recovery process. Even if we are talking about legislation that
has never been tested before the courts, we must attempt to satisfy ourselves
that we have a mechanism for the settlement of claims which is both expeditious and fair.
Chairman McDougal
Mr. Wang, I would like to ask you two questions. First, how would you
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justify the lawfulness, under international law, of the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act? I have said publicly that Canada might be able to make out
a good case in its favor.
Erik Wang
I believe that action was justified under a number of headings relating to
the right of a coastal state to take measures to defend itself against major
damage to its coastline. There was a vacuum in international law. Technology
had moved well ahead of international lawyers, and it would have been irresponsible for Canada not to move into this area with a set of rules-purely
on a functional basis-which could be accepted by industry and the other
interests involved.
When the Prime Minister introduced the legislation in 1970, he pointed
out that international environmental law was in a process of evolution. I
think subsequent events have borne that out. This is aptly demonstrated by
the Law of the Sea Conference. Attitudes have changed. There has been a
consciousness-raising process regarding the dangers of offshore pollution. An
article in the most recent Informal Composite Negotiating Text, which
emerged from the Conference, specifically recognizes the rights of coastal
states to take special environmental protection measures in isolated areas. We
view this as belated recognition, seven years after the event, of the justification for the original action.
Chairman McDougal
My second question is: what are the disadvantages of parallel action?
Erik Wang
There are a number of problems there, of course. One of the major
problems, from a conceptual point of view, would be the problem of
reciprocity.
Chairman McDougal
What is it that does the most damage to aliens and has done so for the
past two hundred years?
Erik Wang
I was not speaking in terms of who does more damage. But if the

damage occurs, will the claimant have rights comparable to those he would
enjoy if he took his case into his own courts? This is a very difficult problem

because we have completely different traditions, legal systems and regulatory
legislative systems. Each of these has its own history of concepts which come
into play in domestic law. For example, if we are discussing the liability
regime that is to apply to a particular form of pollution, there may be a hundred years of tradition behind American law which calls for the imposition of

absolute liability, subject to four or five defences. Our legal tradition may be
very different.
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Chairman McDougal
I am suggesting that the greatest damage done to aliens is through national law. This is why we have the international law of the responsibility of
states. The use of state law in "parallel law" is inadequate. It is necessary to
give the poor fellow who is injured some recourse beyond state law because
state officials are, by and large, the ones who are doing the damage. To
expect them to make redress is a little optimistic. Perhaps something can be
said for both parallel action and action on the international level.
Erik Wang
There are no easy answers. I believe the best line of approach, until we
are satisfied that it cannot yield adequate results, is the line of parallel legislation on each side of a national boundary.
Chairman McDougal
This would be better than the alternative?
Erik Wang
Yes, I believe it would be. May I ask you a question, Professor? How
would you characterize the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act at this
moment? Would you consider it consistent with emerging developments in
international law?
Chairman McDougal
I was not referring to its validity merely in terms of emerging developments. I said it was possibly a lawful contiguous zone under doctrines nearly
two hundred years old, embodying the concept of reasonableness. The question is: was the action reasonable in its particular context? Was the threat to
Canada sufficiently great and the cost to the United States sufficiently small
such that it was reasonable for Canada to do this? I think Canada could
justify its actions without the new doctrines. This is precisely the same concept that underlies the customary international law concerning the environment.
Jan Schneider
I would justify the Arctic Waters Pollution Act on even broader grounds.
The basic rationale is one of self-defense or self-protection. This rationale is
upheld in the whole broad customary law and is incorporated in the reasonableness principle of contiguous zones. The reasonableness of a self-protective
measure depends on whether environmental integrity is deemed an aspect of
territorial sovereignty. If it is, then a state can take reasonable measures to
protect its environment as part of self-defense. Contiguous zones are one
aspect of that law.
Chairman McDougal
Would you require immediate, overwhelming necessity?
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Jan Schneider
There may be an overwhelming necessity under your concept of "selfprotection" or "security." You can have a long-term threat to a vital interest.
In any case, whether the protective principle is a condition of transboundary
or other kinds of relations, I think it is what you have to look at.
Environmental integrity is a part of territorial sovereignty. It was the
Canada-United States Boundary Waters Treaty in 1909 which first established
that, and the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement assumed it. The
Trans-Alaska Pipeline example was an exchange over the same basic issue:
environmental integrity and whether there is a right and responsibility to protect and preserve it.
Turning to Erik Wang's specific arguments, I think the "ice-covered
areas" provision in the I.C.N.T. is a solidification of the legality of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. It writes backward in time by saying
that if this was not legal at the time it was done, it is legal now and will
henceforth be legal. But I do not believe this was really needed, other than as
a political ratification of the Act, because there is a whole body of international environmental law which supports it.
The norms that are usually cited, summarized in Stockholm Principles 21
and 22, reflect preexisting doctrines of state responsibility. Principle 21 says
the right of states to have resources is conditioned upon environmental factors. States have a right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies. Principle 22 imposes a responsibility to see that the
activities of states do not injure the' interests of other countries or common
resources. States must also provide compensation for the victims of their
mistakes.
Chairman McDougal
Can you indicate what that responsibility is?
Jan Schneider
It has been determined in several situations. In the Trail Smelter case, a
Rylands v. Fletcher strict liability standard was imposed. In the Gut Dam
arbitration, between Canada and the United States, a similar standard was
enunciated. There are also the Corfu Channel standard and the Lake Lanoux
decision. In short, there is an evolving pattern of those things which people
consider vital problems, and there has been an evolving caselaw in which we
have been attempting to define environmental needs and preferences in practical terms.
I very much agree with Mr. Wang's characterization that the International Joint Commission is making law. On a day-to-day practical basis, we
are discovering the priorities of the two countries, how they are to be dealt
with together and what substantive results we want. The Vessel Traffic
Management negotiations between our two governments, the Beaufort Sea
offshore drilling claims, and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline issue are all situation,
where law is being made on the bilateral and international planes. What are
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the international rights that should be taken into account by neighboring
countries? Our two governments are trying to ascertain and implement these
norms.
The trouble is that there are also other instances where these rights are
not being recognized today, and they are equally or more disturbing. The
I.C.N.T. has a nice provision on "ice-covered areas," but it also happens to
have a terrible provision on the territorial sea. That text says that no state
can pass a law affecting vessel construction, design, equipment, maintenance
and manning standards in its own territorial sea. If we acknowledge, by virtue of the reasonableness premise of contiguous zones, that environmental
integrity is something states have the right to protect, then states certainly
have a right to decide what standards are going to be applied in an area that
has been under their sovereignty since time immemorial. The ratification of
"ice-covered areas" in one provision must be balanced against the fact that
the protection of sovereign environmental rights and interests is disregarded
and/or undermined in another article. This is absolutely the worst part of the
proposed new Law of the Sea Treaty from an environmental point of view. It
is something which might even cause a concerned environmentalist to advocate dumping the whole thing.
Finally, I would like to raise a separate question concerning private
redress. I am somewhat confused with respect to the problems of effective enforcement on both sides. As I understand the Dryden Chemicals case, Canada
does not have long-arm jurisdiction and extraterritorial reach. It appears that
one province cannot exercise jurisdiction and control over a company in
another province as readily as this might be accomplished between different
states. In the United States, this would not be as much of a problem, and it
would not be much of a problem even against Canadian offenders. The
bilateral difficulty for the United States is more one of enforcement of
judgments, rather than Canada's substantive problem of legal reach. I raise
this point because I do not understand Canadian law, generally, nor the
Dryden Chemicals case in particular. However, that case seems far behind
United States law in the area of environmental torts.
Professor de Mestral, do you have any response to that?
Armand de Mestral
It stems from the doctrine of the incompetence of provinces to adopt
legislation having extraterritorial affect.
Jan Schneider
In other words, the United States would have fewer problems in a transboundary situation. This is more of a Canadian problem, except for the enforcement of judgments.
Armand de Mestral
Unless new law is made by Parliament to fill that gap.
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Jan Schneider
Would it be easier to get a judgment in the United States against Canadian polluters than the other way around?
Armand de Mestral
I think so, if you are implementing new legislation in particular Canadian provinces.
Jan Schneider
Thank you.
Erik Wang
The Informal Composite Negotiating Text provisions relating to coastalstate powers in the twelve-mile territorial sea are of very serious concern to
us. We have not yet given up all hope of having them improved at the next
session of the Law of the Sea Conference. We have been working vigorously
with a group of like-minded states to see if these provisions can be improved.
I imagine after five sessions of the Conference, some of this language in the
text is beginning to take very concrete form. Some of it, of course, we find
congenial and attractive; other provisions are distinctly unattractive. Those
relating to the twelve-mile territorial sea and to the rights of coastal states
within the two, hundred-mile zone are unattractive. I would not like to
speculate as to how Canada might eventually view an overall package that
contained a number of good provisions, as well as a number of poor ones. It
will ultimately be a political judgment for governments to determine where
their best interests lie before deciding whether to sign a new oceans agreement.
I would, however, add one practical point which should not be overlooked.
It is some consolation that most of the marine traffic on our coasts is bound
for either Canadian or United States ports. This is a function of our geographical position. Other countries in the world have a good deal of traffic
going through their territorial waters which never comes close to their ports
or the ports of neighboring states. The implication of this pattern of traffic is
that one can look to the increased port-state powers, in the evolving text, for
a stringent regime of control over standards, design, construction, manning
and equipment. There is a significant degree of compatibility and harmony
of standards between the United States and Canada. Indeed, in the recent
Vessel Traffic Management negotiations on the west coast, the two Coast
Guards made a detailed examination of regulations in a host of areas relating
to very specific, technical requirements. The conclusion reached from the
comparative study, with respect to pollution control, was that there is a very
high level of compatibility and uniformity. There are differences. In some
cases, American requirements and regulations are more stringent than ours.
In other instances, Canadian requirements are more stringent.
This is a very practical approach to the problem. If we can be satisfied
that shipping in our waters will become subject to either our jurisdiction in
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our ports, or subject to the jurisdiction of a country with standards in which
we have confidence, we can become less uneasy about any erosion of coastal
state powers that might take place in the text itself.
Jan Schneider
I have two related questions to ask Mr. Wang. First, I cannot see that
any country will accept or reject the new Law of the Sea Treaty on environmental grounds, so I do not accept that as an initial premise. Nevertheless,
assume we were to evaluate it solely from an environmental point of view.
Can it not be said that the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act has, in a
sense, been ratified at the expense of fundamental international legal norms
upon which it was based and justified?
Second, you emphasized bilateral standards, and much has been said
about the need for regional measures. It is true there aie similar standards
in our two countries for safeguarding against vessel-source pollution. It seems
necessary, however, to look at the broad context, as well: the protection and
preservation of the total global environment. Are you really less uneasy about
erosion of coastal-state powers from the overall point of view of codification
and progressive development of international law for the world community?
Erik Wang
Your first question, if I understand you correctly, is whether there was
some sort of trade-off in the negotiating process, whereby Canada got what it
wanted on ice-covered areas and seemed to be content to take a less acceptable result on territorial waters. I am afraid I do not see it in those terms.
Jan Schneider
I did not necessarily mean a political trade-off. I was suggesting that the
Conference, as a whole, may have acquiesced in the special case, while having effectively rejected or undermined general environmental protection principles. The text appears to say that henceforth, the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act is a recognized exception, but further measures to prevent
pollution are not going to be accepted anywhere else.
Erik Wang
Based upon the discussions I have participated in, originally at Caracas
and again at Geneva, I would not characterize the interrelationship in such a
manner. The problem of ice-covered and special areas was dealt with, to a
large extent, as a very separate problem. There are amendments to the Oil
Pollution Convention, which make special reference to the Great Barrier Reef
of Australia. I think this was treated as an exceptional case. With respect to
territorial waters generally, the maritime powers with shipping interests have
had a major voice in the development of the language in the I.C.N.T., for
better or worse.
In response to your second question, I have to plead "functionalism." I
become slightly uncomfortable when people ask if we are concerned about

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:98

sovereignty because no one has ever been able to define sovereignty for me in
a simple way. In this case, I think you have to consider the broad question of
what rights we now have concerning the territorial sea, and to what extent we
would be relinquishing those rights. Would this be viewed as a retreat from
sovereignty? This is a serious question which must be addressed by governments. At the same time, I hope we would not lose sight of what we are trying to do with sovereignty. Presumably, we exercise our rights, not because it
makes Canadian hearts beat faster, but because we have specific interests to
protect or to promote. If we feel we can protect and promote specific rights
and interests by a functional approach, that may weigh in the final determination of what is politically acceptable for Canada.
Charles A. Marvin
Mr. Chairman, in 1955, you wrote an article about nuclear testing in the
Pacific Ocean. In the context of what Mr. Epstein has said, if you were
writing that article today, what generalized norms (not specific treaties,
necessarily) have emerged in the last twenty years which might have changed
your mind?
Chairman McDougal
Recent developments have not changed my mind; they have strengthened
my position.
Charles Marvin
Well, you were speaking about the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act. Assume it is reasonable to establish some standards from a unilateral,
national point of view. In a situation with so many millions of people living
along the Arctic and Beaufort Sea, I would suggest that the issue of reasonableness would be removed from the question of drawing standards or lines of
proscription, to the question of what is the amount of damage done. I could
imagine a case where the coastline or the ice is severely damaged. Unilaterally,
the Canadian government could decide to send men and material to clean it
up for millions of dollars. Then, the responsibility might be shifted to somewhere else. It could be along the coastline of Prince Edward Island, for example. I am suggesting that, from one spot in the biosphere to another, you
should pose serious questions as to whether you are going from an act that
would be characterized as pollution in one instance, to a situation where,
solely on the grounds of reasonableness, perhaps it should not be so characterized.
There is another problem I wanted to bring up. In the literature a few
years ago, Professor Coase and others of the Chicago school were worried
about governments taking unilateral action and making certain areas national
parks or crown lands, where no activities other than passive appreciation were
to be allowed. Disregarding the fact that the natural world is changing all the
time, sanctions are going to be applied against people who wish to be doing
something in connection with resources which are located in a given place.
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Compromises have been reached in areas where industries are well established, such as maintaining a maximum sustainable yield of certain stocks of
fish in the sea. What about companies that might wish to obtain and exercise
timber rights, for example? In Ontario, the commission under Mr. Justice
Hart will be looking into the activities of the Reid Paper Company in northwestern Ontario. Perhaps questions will be raised concerning what is being
done to the resources on Ontario soil?
In any event, I just wanted to raise these two categories of questions:
First, are we not talking about standards on one level, but reasonableness as
to damages on another? Second, why should we distinguish active human intervention from passive appreciation which is not characterized as human
activity, during which time nature is making the changes?
Chairman McDougal
I think I can answer Professor Marvin with a brief summary. What I was
trying to draw out, in relation to customary law, is a relatively simple point.
If you take all the sources of law that have been mentioned here this afternoon- Article 21 of the Stockholm Resolution, the old Trail Smelter opinion,
the Lake Lanoux decision, the Corfu Channel case, and so on- you do have
a customary norm that Mr. Epstein put in an immemorial Latin phrase. The
origins of this policy go back for centuries. States and other communities are
to be held responsible for the damage they do to others.
What is the nature of this responsibility, and how is it to be measured?
The contiguous zone concept is one that requires exploration. A history of
two hundred years is fortified by an ancient decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States. A seizure, by the Portuguese, of a ship two hundred miles
off the coast of Brazil was held to be a reasonable effort to protect Brazil's
commercial interests. The fundamental policy underlying the contiguous zone
concept is exactly the same as that which underlies objective territoriality: a
state may take reasonable measures to protect its internal value processes
from injuries from the outside. When it is invoked to make states responsible
for damage to the environment, this fundamental doctrine of customary law
requires the decision-maker to look at all the facts of the case in context.
This is true whether the legal standard is absolute liability, strict liability
or negligence. Precisely what has the defendant been doing? How much
damage did he do or does he threaten to do? How important is that damage
to the defendant? What, precisely, was the hurt to the complainant? How
important is that to him or others? What alternatives are available to the parties for reducing damage? What alternatives are available to the community?
Ultimately, you come to the concept of reasonableness, Mr. Marvin, and
reasonableness must depend upon the facts of the case in context. If irreversible damage is being done by the tankers that go through the Arctic, then
you do not have to prove there are millions of people living on the shores in
order to show the unreasonableness of this behavior.
There must be a very disciplined contextual analysis of the whole problem, in light of the common interests of both complainants and perpetrators.
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What should be done about the problem on a transnational basis? This idea
is very old. This is the argument I used on the earlier nuclear tests, and I
would still use it. I would use the same argument to establish that what the
French did was unlawful. The judgment is one that must be made in light of
all the surrounding circumstances. This is the only way these cases have ever
been decided. It is the only way they can be decided. All the talk in terms of
legal technicalities is merely a way of posing certain fundamental policy
issues.
Do we want faster transportation and communication, or a little healthier
environment? Do we want to keep something for our descendants or do we
want to destroy it all now? These are very fundamental policy issues that
underlie the appraisal of reasonableness. These are the kinds of questions
which need to be raised. These are the policies that determine the choices in
particular instances.
The best way of handling most of these problems would be to keep them
from coming up. Preventive and deterrent measures require the establishment
of institutions very different from courts and arbitral tribunals. We might
want to recommend that the settlement of disputes is simply not the best way
to do the job. The better way of preventing damage might be by cooperating,
in advance, across national boundaries. This could take many forms. Hospital
cases will, of course, continue to come up; they will come up, in some
measure, even with the best precautions. This requires consideration of the
modalities itemized in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. Is there any
way we can order these different modalities for settling "disputes" and achieve
a more economic mode of ensuring reasonableness in decision? Finally, must
we have the Court in the background? Do we require third-party compulsory
decision-making? All that I see at the moment are questions.
Professor de Mestral, do you want to add anything?
Armand de Mestral
At the present time, would we be better off bringing it down to the
Canada-United States situation? Should these two countries seek to resolve
many of their problems on a bilateral basis, or are we better off attempting
to promote broad multilateral global solutions? I think this is something all
governments have to go through continually, and I do not believe they have
any clear answers.
Chairman McDougal
I think we do have to go forward bilaterally. I am very skeptical of
unilateral, or even parallel, action. We may have to involve Mexico. We
should try to set up a model for a continental area that might be used elsewhere. Nevertheless, we should still try to get the best law of the sea conventions possible, and the best multilateral conventions on all the different
specific problems. The little experience I have had suggests that our two
countries cooperate almost automatically. Ambassador Wershof and members
of the United States delegation to the Vienna Conference on the Law of
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Treaties cooperated without the slightest effort. We automatically came
together. We had a common interest, we saw it, and we acted accordingly. I
think we do have a common interest on the whole environmental problem.

